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• ABSTRACT 
Managing Healthcare Costs Through 
Structural Rearrangement of Hospitals: 
An Activity Based Management Perspective 
Wonsick Lee 
Assistant Professor of Management 
Central Connecticut State University 
Sakthi Mahenthiran 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
Penn State University at Erie 
We examine a structural deficiency in the healthcare system that hinders implementation of a 
meaningful cost accounting system, and suggest an alternative organizational arrangement that can 
facilitate introducing cost control mechanisms. We argue that hospitals need structural 
rearrangement so that cost-driving activities can be traced, and their costs allocated to responsibility 
centers. We suggest that this structural rearrangement is a precondition for implementing any 
meaningful activity-based cost management system. We also suggest a basic framework for value 
analysis of activities for healthcare providers, and discuss how this framework can be used as a 
vehicle for controlling diagnostic costs .. 
Background 
American political leaders are concerned about increases in healthcare costs and are 
attempting to identifY the problems in healthcare administration. Some critics of the present 
healthcare system warn of the possibility of sky-rocketing healthcare cost bankrupting the 
American economy in the next few decades. An Activity Based Cost Accounting (ABC) 
system has been suggested as an effective tool to manage and control costs in hospitals 
(Chari, 1993). ABC is receiving a lot of attention among corporate controllers and other cost 
accounting professionals. By distinguishing value-added from non-valued activities and 
focusing on reducing the cost of non-valued activities, organizations can achieve cost 
savings without damaging the quality of products or services offered (Cooper and Kaplan, 
Requests for reprints or correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: Wonsick Lee, Central 
Connecticut State University, School of Business, and Sakthi Mahenthiran, Penn State University at Erie, 
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1991). This approach to cost control is well established in the manufacturing sector (Hawks, 
Bondies, Strong and Reid 1992; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992). 
Unlike manufacturing industries, hospitals and other service sector organizations have 
an inseparable reciprocal relationship between the service delivery process and the service 
outcomes. Therefore, it is much more complicated and difficult to introduce an ABC system 
of cost management in hospital organizations. Further, in this paper we point out the 
structural impediments to implementing an activity based management system in a hospital. 
In attempting to examine the possibility of introducing an ABC system, we considered 
that there are fundamental structural problems that inhibit cost management in the 
healthcare industry. In service organizations, efficiency improvements are inherently tied to 
improving labor productivity (Hemeon, 1989). In developing measures of employee 
activities in service organizations, it has been suggested that the time spent by employees 
for various activities be sampled at representative points in time (Crane and Meyer, 1993; 
Hilton, 1991). The time data can then be transformed to cost information. 
In one pre-arranged instance, we attempted to sample cost data in a hospital based on 
guidelines suggested in the accounting literature. Based on our analysis of the sampled data, 
we made recommendations to rearrange employees' activities in order to improve the cost 
management system, particularly those of laboratory technicians. The hospital 
administrators strongly opposed any such rearrangement of activities. They argued that the 
lab was operating at full capacity, and hence, the rearrangement of activities would not help 
reduce costs. This and similar incidents have made us believe that certain pre-conditions 
must be met before any cost management is considered seriously. Systemic incentives must 
be provided to all the constituents involved in order to attempt substantive cost control in a 
hospital. 
In the United Kingdom attempts are currently underway to implement management 
information systems that are founded on the principles of activity based cost management 
systems (Holford and McAulay, 1987a and 1987b). The National Health Service (NHS) in 
the U.K. found that unless physicians are held accountable for the budgets they have 
traditionally prepared, administrators will find it difficult to hold anyone accountable for 
cost overruns in the hospital departments. NHS would like physicians to be responsible for 
preparing budgets along "patient portfolios" rather than along functional lines. This belief 
of NHS is a necessary first step for requiring departments to analyze their activities along 
specialties (i. e., treatment groups) they care for. The NHS believes this would avoid 
arbitrary allocations that are presently necessary to arrive at the full costs of providing 
treatments to particular diagnosis related treatment groups. However, an NHS enforced, 
unilateral approach to introducing the necessary information system is not likely to succeed 
in the U.S. because in the U.S. physicians typically are not employees of a hospital, or of a 
central agency such as the NHS. Hence, there is a need for structural rearrangement to align 
incentives of U.S. physicians with those of the hospitals in which they practice. 
Founded on such conclusions, we undertake the following tasks in this paper: (1) we 
examine the structural deficiency in the healthcare system which we believe prevents cost-
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management; (2) suggest an alternative organizational arrangement which can better align 
the incentives of healthcare providers (we believe that this structural rearrangement is a 
precondition for implementation of the meaningful, activity-based cost management 
system), and (3) suggest a basic framework of value analysis which can be used to analyze 
healthcare service activities. 
Current Structural Arrangement in For-Profit Hospitals and Cost Management 
The current structural arrangement of for-profit hOspitals can be summarized as a 
"dual-control" system: professional medical services are controlled by a group of senior 
physicians and administrative services are controlled by hospital staff administrators. 
Although hospital administrative executives may have formal authority over professional 
services in a hospital, they will rarely exercise their authority to overrule the medical 
practices of physicians. Practically, administrators may not have power over medical 
professionals, as argued by strategic contingency theorists (e.g., Pfeffer, 1983; Hinings, 
Hickson, Pennings and Schneck, 1974). This is because medical professionals, especially 
physicians, contribute to critical resources (i. e., patients), upon which hospitals depend. 
This "dual control" system is well illustrated in an actual organization chart of a local 
hospital the authors studied (See Exhibit 1). 
The formal organizational chart of the hospital depicted in Exhibit I is modified to 
show actual lines of authority among functions and positions. The executive administrative 
director has direct control of non-medical staff functions. He has formal authority over 
medical services, though no real and direct formal control over professional service 
functions, as noted by the broken lines. On the other hand, the executive committee of 
physicians and dentists has direct influence over all professional, medical service activities. 
They, in fact, have significantly more influence over various staff service activities than 
executive administrators do. The dual authority system of this local hospital is not a-typical 
for hospitals. 
The Hospital Administrators 
In most traditional investor owned hospitals, administration is separated from the 
activities of delivering medical services. Most of the physicians serving in a hospital are 
effectively customers of the hospitals (independent contractors). The physicians bring their 
own patients to the hospital and book use of the hospital facilities on behalf of their patients. 
Even when administration is involved in managing all the departments that provide various 
treatment-related services, including diagnostic lab tests, they have little or no influence 
over clinical decisions for extensive diagnostic testing. By not being engaged in clinical 
decisions, hospital administrators are removed from direct responsibility for the cost 
effectiveness of patient care. As long as hospital expenses are recovered, the administrators 
have significant disincentives to interfere with physicians' professional autonomy. The 
hospital administration has a symbiotic-relationship with physicians. By having such a 
structural arrangement, both parties benefit: the administrators avoid clinical responsibility 
and the physicians maximize professional autonomy without administrative interference. In 
terms of cost control, the administrators are largely concerned with cost recovery. As long 
as cost is recovered (including cost of capital), more services and more tests are better for 
hospitals than less. In fact, increased volume of services rendered does not seem to be a 
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EXHIBIT 1 
MILLCREEK' HOSPITAL 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
Board of Directors -----
Executive Administrative Executive Committee of 
Director Physicians and Dentists 
___ DU ___________ ~ ______ ~--~------------------r--- ___________________ 1 
, , , 
, , , 
r---------------- ----r------------------1--, , , 
' , , : , , , , : , , , , 
Director Director Director Director Director 
of Finance of Hosptlal of Nursing of Professiollal Medical 
Servu:es Services EdlcatiOll 
Admittin3 CU, N1fSIII8 PlaysiDtheraply Quality of 
Dielary Services Resptrtory Care 
I 
Business Office HDDSBkeep1llJ EmergOll:)' Teclllllllqjy lI.dics1 Stoff 
LllIldry & Outpatient. Family Iledi- CIliefsof 
Payroll Linen N1mII8 UnilS ~Unit 5enices 
l&ailllenallCe 0pera11l8 Laboralories 
Vo11ll1teers Plant EIgi- 51Lt Psychiatry 
neering lladioJ0JY 
Psrchasilg Speech 
Switchboard nerapy 
Note: ,The actual name of the hospital is changed. 
Solid line, " __ ," denotes direct control and accountability. 
Broken line, " ..... ," denotes indirect control with no direct accountability. 
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problem as long as the administrators appropriately screen patients for payment ability. 
Even for this screening of qualified patients, the administrators can rely on physicians to a 
certain extent. 
In this traditional arrangement of hospital organizations, the critical uncertainty or the 
real strategic goal of profit-seeking hospitals is higher occupancy rate and more treatments, 
for which the administrators are critically dependent upon independent physicians. Since 
most of the high price-tag services are paid by a third party, typically an insurance company 
or the government, higher occupancy and more treatment is the implicit rule of the game for 
investor-owned hospitals. Hence, influence of administrators over medical professionals is 
limited. Thus, with an unaccountable relationship, cost management is of low importance to 
independent physicians (Glandon and Morrisey, 1986). 
In Exhibit 1, the organization's control line for the administrative executive, (who 
tends to be more cost-conscious), is even thinner than the control line of the professional 
services executive, who has little or no incentive for cost containment. In fact, by having 
such a dual control system, each control line may deflect more troublesome cost issues to 
the other side. 
The Medical Professionals 
Physicians are professionally trained to effectively treat symptoms of injury and 
disease. Because of the need to minimize malpractice claims, physicians also have an 
incentive to over-provide the most comprehensive care in treatment of the patients' 
symptoms. It is frequently the case that ordering all tests is a safer defense than not doing 
some test, which can be a devastating fault in a court hearing. In addition, because of the 
physicians' customer status (independent contractor) and the dual control system, hospital 
administrators rarely make any attempt to curb the physicians' clinical autonomy. In such a 
context, with little or no incentive for cQst effective diagnoses, medical professionals are 
less concerned with direct costs involved in treating particular symptoms of a disease. 
For example, more than $25 million is spent nationwide on tests to diagnose jaundice 
in newborn children. Newman, Easterling, Goldman, and Stevenson (1990) questioned the 
need for the whole battery of tests shown in Exhibit 2. According to these authors, a more 
cost effective way to diagnose jaundice in a newborn is to check the mother's medical 
history, do a thorough physical examination of the newborn, and check the initial 
hematocritic levels. Bilirubin tests and Reticulocyte count are of questionable value for 
jaundice evaluation. The fact that physicians routinely request the whole battery of tests 
lead us to believe that medical practice emphasizes the value of all diagnosing procedures 
more than the value of a patient's history and a thorough physical examination of the 
patient. 
Given the present legal system and hospital/physician structural arrangement, 
physicians have little incentive to question the value of extensive diagnostic procedures. 
This is due to the high costs involved for not performing the procedures (e.g., the costs of 
malpractice litigation and the damage to professional reputation). These approaches have 
become institutionalized in healthcare organizations. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
CHARGES AT UCSF' FOR TESTS TO 
EVALUATE JAUNDICE IN NEWBORNS 
Tests UCSF Charges 
- Bilirubin 
Direct $19.75 
Total 7.75 
- Complete Blood Count 21.00 
- Blood Type 12.00 
- Blood Group 12.00 
- Direct Coombs 25.00 
- Reticulocyte Count 19.00 
- Red Blood Cell 8.00 
Total $124.50 
Source: University of California, San Francisco, Medical Center. (Newman, B.T., J., 
Easterling, E.S. Goldman, and D.K. Stevenson, "Laboratory Evaluation of Jaundice in 
Newborns," American Journal ojDiagnosis, No. 144, 1990, p. 364). 
One way or another, patients are screened in terms of their ability to pay. Most of the 
prestigious physicians maintain a list of "financially qualified" patients. Hospital 
administrators are more concerned about the reputation of the physicians than about their 
style of practicing medicine. On the part of hospital administrators, recruiting outstanding 
physicians is a competitive process: a process that includes attracting physicians by offering 
state-of-the-art diagnostic and technical facilities. For physicians, maintaining their clinical 
reputation is far more important than delivering a "cost-control" reputation. 
A hospital that has superior facilities and allows greater autonomy to physicians, has 
greater ability to attract physicians. In other words, in this arrangement, the important 
strategic concern of physicians is maintaining their professional, clinical reputation 
regardless of resources consumed. Clearly, cost control is a low priority to them. Quite 
naturally, as pointed out earlier, physicians thus gain power within healthcare organizations 
(i. e., Critical contingency theory, Hinings et ai, 1974). This explains why the professional 
control line in Exhibit 1 is thicker than the administrative line. 
Other Constituents: Lab Technicians, Nurses, and Patients 
Lab clinicians are dejJendent on physicians' work orders. More tests mean keeping 
their lab open, and keeping technicians employed. The administration helps lab technicians 
operate in full or even expanded capacity. Frequently, the more rare and expensive tests 
accrue to the technicians' advantage, enhancing their professional experience opportunities. 
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In other words, lab technicians are also shielded from cost control incentives, and may not 
be structurally part of cost or price related decision activity for their services. 
Nurses also have little control over the administrative as well as the clinical decisions. 
Little incentive exists for cost contaimnent by nurses, as long as they comply with 
administrative policies and, more importantly, with physicians' instructions. In fact, 
because administrators may not pressure nurses for managing costs or clinical decisions, 
nurses are better off remaining neutral in their relationship with both administrators and 
physicians. Nurses function as employees of the hospital, providing services for the 
physicians. 
Patients are concerned aboui the costs and bills they will receive. However, the 
uncertainty and complexity related to medical diagnosis and its implications for prognosis 
put patients largely at the mercy of healthcare professionals. As long as bills are 
predominantly reimbursed by a third party (the govermnent or an insurance company), 
patients generally follow the instructions of physicians to maximize, presumably, the 
quality and benefits of medical services they receive. 
Thus, in sununary, in investor owned hospitals, physicians have a substantial amount 
of influence over the healthcare service delivery process. They are professionally 
independent from other constituents, including hospital administration and insurance 
companies. Physicians are primarily concerned with the delivery of medical services, rather 
than the cost effectiveness of the delivery process. Other constituents in this arrangement 
have neither the strategic interest nor the power to push for cost management. 
Structural Arrangement in Not-For-Profit Hospitals and Cost Management 
State-run hospitals and university-related hospitals are the two most prominent forms 
of not-for-profit hospitals (though not the greatest number). The strategic goal of state-run 
hospitals lies, formally at least, in providing medical services to all of the needy and 
qualified, within their budgetary constraints. Becanse of their budgetary constraint and large 
demand for services, it may be the case that all patients do not necessarily receive the same 
quality of service as in a for-profit hospital. Patients often need to wait longer for care. For 
some cases, these not-for-profit hospitals might actually be more cost-conscious because of 
their budgetary constraints and demand for services. But, this does not necessarily mean 
that they are operated on a more cost-effective basis. Cost can be kept within the budget by 
minimizing the total long-run amount of patient care provided during a given time period, 
without reducing the cost of patient care. As long as these not-for-profit hospitals can justify 
the cost incurred, they do not have to concern themselves quite as much about the quantity 
and quality of the treatments they provide over the long run. 
University-related teaching hospitals are operated under largely the same cost principle 
as not-for-profit state-owned hospitals. Most of the services, including diagnostic lab tests, 
are reimbursed through a university-wide budgeting process. Educationally justified costs 
are reimbursed. Economical ways of conducting tests or screening what to test and what not 
to test (cost efficiency and cost effectiveness) is not a predominant principle. Rare tests 
and/or more expensive tests are preferred because of their instructional value. For instance, 
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in a case study we conducted in a university-related diagnostic lab, the hospital 
administrators seemed to be more concerned about the volume of tests performed than the 
cost efficiency and cost effectiveness of the tests. The critical uncertainty outside of the 
administrators' direct control was the steady flow of teaching subjects, i.e., patients. 
Because of the stated goal of education, any cost incurred in providing clinical tests was 
easily justified. Exhibits 3 and 4 show the source of funds and the service price-cost 
comparison for the study we conducted. All the expense incurred in the lab was recovered, 
and the lab had a surplus: 81 % from service fees and 25% from the college, leaving a 6% 
surplus. 
One of the cost practices at this lab was as follows: their estimate for the budgeted level 
of service for a given year was set equal to the previous year's level of service. At the 
beginning of each year, the administrative staff conducted a physical count of inventories 
and placed orders for materials based on the last year's volume. No attempt was made to 
trace the materials cost of tests actually performed. However, the administrators 
marginalized the importance of material control based on the reasoning that materials used 
for these tests had little, if any, personal value to the technicians and would therefore not be 
subject to mismanagement. Furthermore, the technicians were allegedly under-paid 
compared to their counterparts in the industry, and hence, administrators seemed to believe 
that providing the technicians with maximum control of their work environment, with 
minimum interference, was one way to help retain good technicians. Thus, the 
administrators believed that tighter work scheduling and detailed cost control efforts would 
not contribute to the hospital's overall cost management efforts. 
In spite of the above mentioned limitations, we sampled the work activities of the 
technicians. We calculated the cost of some tests that were frequently requested. From our 
calculations we found that three tests (out of 12 in our sample) did not even cover their own 
prime costs (materials and labor) (See Exhibit 4). 
As far as these tests were concerned, the greater the need for these tests, the greater the 
need for funding. Without such cost information for activities (i.e., tests), administrators did 
not know where to cut costs or how to require the physicians to evaluate costs and benefits 
of the tests. But, since there was little incentive for cost saving, expansion through increased 
expenditure, and consequently increased funding, when justifiable, served to promote the 
interests of several constituents. 
Each party involved in this type of organizational arrangement will have disincentives 
to initiate a cost efficient and cost effective process for delivering healthcare service. Market 
economists suggest that not-for-profit institutions may not have the proper incentives to 
optimize their use of resources. They may be more concerned about the distribution of 
healthcare services within the community they serve. 
In both state-run and university-related hospitals, medical professionals may use the 
hospital as a leaming and experimental site. They may enhance their own professional 
experience or conduct research, putting cost at a lower priority. Thus, patients with a rare 
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EXHIBIT 3 
SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR A 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT DIAGNOSTIC LAB 
Source of Funds Amount Percentage 
Fee for Services $389,193.00 81% 
Funds from College 120,152.00 25 
Funds Available $509,345.00 106% 
Total 91-92 Expenditure $482,800.00 100 
i Surplus 26,545.00 +6% 
Source: Authors' research of a diagnostic lab; this lab is part of a lmiversity-related hospital 
function. 
EXHIBIT 4 
PRICE AND COST COMPARISON IN 
THE DIAGNOSTIC LAB 
Type of test Volume Revenue Labor Prime 
Cost Cost 
Tests that are subsidized: 
AN-Antibody 520 $10,400 $27,560 $31,874 
Blood Gas 2,290 16,023 2,290 36,074 
Blood Gas/Electrolytes 2,410 36,135 21,681 62,610 
Sub-total 
Contri-
bution 
(Loss) 
($21,474) 
(20,052) 
(26,475) 
($68,001) 
Source: Authors' research of a diagnostic lab; this lab is part of a university-related hospital 
function. 
disease are welcomed even when costs for tests and treatments are usually high, since the 
patients need to be treated and the illness has high experience value. 
New Organizational Arrangement and Cost Management 
There are three key factors that we attempt to balance in order to offer an improved 
solution to the existing healthcare problems in the U.S.: to reduce the healthcare cost (cost 
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control) without lowering the quality of services (cost effectiveness) offered to the largest 
number of people who need the care (cost efficiency). The best mechanism that a 
capitalistic society has provided for balancing these factors for goods and services is the 
market pricing mechanism. In such a mechanism, over-priced services without comparable 
quality will lose out to competitors. However, it seems that U.S. political leaders do not 
want to allow free price competition for healthcare services for a number of important 
reasons. 
First, the consumer seems to find it difficult to tolerate healthcare quality differentials 
based on price. In order to maintain "good" healthcare service and to train a qualified 
medical professional, it takes a substantial amount of time and resources. Because of the 
substantial idiosyncratic investment necessary, providers want to assume that quality is 
given. Also, since healthcare tends to be commnnity-based, there may not be enough 
providers in each county--especially in rural areas-to drive down prices through free-
market competition. In addition, there may be an overall loss of social welfare through the 
potential loss of important resources and technology if medical professionals and 
institutions fail due to unrestrained price competition. 
Medical services provided today are also so complex in nature that it is not always easy 
for even the well informed consumer to detennine quality differences. As a result of this 
information asymmetry, medical professionals attain more autonomy and discretion than 
other constituents in the healthcare industry. Ironically, it is this inability to accurately 
measure quality of care that makes curbing medical cost increases even more difficult. In 
the following section, we discuss some suggestions for a new structural arrangement to 
achieve a balance on these three important issues: cost reduction, cost effectiveness, and 
cost efficiency of services offered. 
External Constraints 
Beginning in 1983, many of the third party cost reimbursement agents, including many 
insurance companies and the U.S. government, adopted a method of payment called the 
Prospective Payment System (PPS). Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed fee per case 
based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) and physicians are paid according to a 
Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) fee schedule for their services. These 
mechanisms have proved to be effective in moderately curbing the rapidly escalating cost 
problem for healthcare services. However, physicians still have medical and financial 
incentives to do everything "beneficial" for patients, without inordinate concern about the 
costs involved. Since hospital administrators do not assume clinical responsibility, they 
thereby continue to encourage physicians to perfonn more tests and provide more services 
that provide greater chargeable volume usage of the hospital. Hospitals and physicians still 
maintain a symbiotic relationship in this regard. 
As in the U.K., it seems that constraints outside of the healthcare industry are necessary 
for controlling costs and delivering healthcare in a cost effective manner. However, setting 
fixed prices for particular services alone may not direct the energies of medical 
professionals and institutions toward optimizing the three factors of providing quality 
service to the largest number of consumers at minimum prices. Hospital administrators and 
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physicians will still have an incentive to provide the largest volume of services, even at 
predetermined prices. Unlike the U.K. and Canada, where there are a single payor systems 
that ration the quantity of care by law, in the U.S. the multiple third party payor system 
encourages the delivery of the maximum amount of services, making it difficult to manage 
cost. It also implicitly rations care, but on the ad hoc basis of economic status, rather than 
through open public policy debate. 
One way of balancing the three factors would be to consider a new organizational 
arrangement, putting administrators and physicians under one organizational structure. In 
Exhibit I, this would be analogous to merging two control lines into one. This arrangement, 
establishing an employer-employee relationship, is not new to organizational theorists, 
though it may be quite radical to U.S. healthcare norms. It follows the traditional, product-
line based hierarchical organization of profit seeking enterprises. The organization as a 
whole is responsible for services delivered to the market, and its success depends on market 
competitiveness. To remain competitive, quality should be the highest possible, prices 
should be the lowest possible, and hence, the production cost should be the lowest possible. 
All parties involved in the process, employers and employees, are responsible for 
optimizing the use of limited resources. . 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations 
(PPOs) have come close to adopting this model. They have shown some success in 
providing cost effective services without creating serious quality problems (Heintz and 
McNerney, 1992). HMOs, as employers, effectively hire medical professionals as 
employees and put them in a traditional organizational hierarchy. It has been pointed out 
that under this arrangement, physicians' autonomy is substantially restricted (Glandon and 
Morrisey, 1986). Physicians are supervised to a greater degree by administrators. The 
increasing number of medical school graduates has enabled HMOs and PPOs to attract 
enough professionals to run such organizations. A prime objective of this arrangement is to 
align physicians' interest with the hospital's financial interest. In addition, the hospital as an 
organization shares clinical responsibility with the physician. Thus, in such an arrangement, 
all parties involved in providing healthcare services-hospital administrators, physicians, 
clinical technicians, and nurses-share both financial and clinical risks of providing care for 
the hospital's "portfolio" of patient care categories. This provides them with incentives to 
devote their energies and resources into concerted actions to achieve the agreed-upon goals 
for a particular group of patients. Cost effective care then becomes a more important 
. strategic goal for the healthcare provider organization. 
InternalltearrangeDlent 
Under continued external pressure for cost control, traditional hospitals face the need 
for organizational rearrangement. The suggested arrangement of employer-employee 
relationship would put administrators and physicians in a more closely tied economic 
relationship in managing healthcare. Their collective efforts will be necessary to respond to 
changes imposed by the emerging national healthcare reform proposals. In other words, due 
to external organizational competition and shared financial interests, hospitals and 
physicians will have to work cooperatively to provide quality services at competitive prices, 
plainly disclosed for public scrutiny. In order to accomplish this as a common goal, both 
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administrators and physicians must first cooperate in rearranging the existing organizational 
structural relationships. Management budgets prepared by treatment categories and 
monitored by physicians would become a reality. 
One such internal structural rearrangement would be to shift from a functional 
organization to a closely integrated "product" design. Since hospitals provide numerous 
services, many of which are inter-related in terms of the skills needed and equipment used 
for treatment, a "product" structure is a more appropriate form for grouping patient service 
efforts. In a "product" structure, similar services that require similar skills and equipment 
are grouped together in a unit, so that individuals can closely work together and be jointly 
accountable for outcomes. 
An important feature of this "product" structure is its focus on building a team, which 
is collectively responsible for assessing market changes and meeting customers' needs. The 
team in the product line identifies target customer groups and provides preventative and 
comprehensive services to the target customers as a team. The team adjusts to changing 
needs of the target market segment: e.g., the customers' demographic characteristics and 
their special needs, price sensitivities of the service, external payment schemes, and other 
external constraints. Furthermore, this product line management enables the hospital to 
better assess its ability and resources available to compete in the customer segment. The 
separate service units assesses whether the market they represent is appropriate and whether 
they can develop and provide a long-term competitive advantage to the consumer. Most 
importantly, this product line based structure serves as a profit center that is responsible for 
the cost-efficiency and marketable quality and volume of patient care services at 
competitive prices. Thus, both clinical and administrative responsibilities will be placed in 
the team that actually provides the services. Once appropriate service teams and support 
teams (cost centers) are established, costs of the support teams can be more meaningfully 
allocated to the service teams using accurate and detailed resource drivers. 
It is a well established cost accounting principle that an appropriate mechanism for cost 
control is to establish a cost center or profit center, in which the head and all other 
subordinate members are personally responsible for the revenue generated and the cost 
incurred. In healthcare, the unit will also be responsible for clinical and quality decisions in 
the management of patient care. Thus, all the members in the unit make a conscious effort 
to control cost as well as to improve the quality and marketability of the services rendered. 
When a senior physician takes charge of a unit, which is likely in many clinical units, he or 
she will assume dual responsibility (clinical as well as administrative responsibility) of the 
unit. If a clinical decision requires intensive and interactive professional judgment, all the 
members in the unit will participate actively in the various clinical and administrative 
decision making processes. For example, a nursing director will have to work closely with 
in-charge physicians to meet the administratively set cost control goal for treatment 
diagnoses and drug related costs. These goals should be set so that they directly affect the 
remuneration of both physicians and nurses. 
This arrangement is analogous to the product structure found in many service firms 
today. The head of each unit specializes in providing a particular type of service, such as 
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pension consulting, healthcare audits, personal taxes, estate taxes, business valuation 
services, to name only a few. The prices for these services are available in the external 
market or may be negotiated with the buyer. If the market price for a particular service does 
not cover its cost, then such a service may be contracted out to a lower-cost provider. The 
major improvement offered by this structure is that the services provided by a particular 
group of healthcare professionals are a product line of the hospital or provider organization. 
The role of external constituents such as government would be to facilitate establishment of 
reliable external market mechanisms for managing competition and requiring information 
disclosures of price, quality and efficiency as is currently being proposed in the Clinton 
administration's healthcare reform plan. This would be done for the majority of routine 
medical services provided by hospitals today. If establishing external market mechanisms 
for certain specialized services proves to be difficult, then direct rate regulation and 
subsidies are supplemental policy tools that may be brought to bear in order to ensure the 
continued provision of such services. 
A Suggestion for Value Analysis of Activities 
One of the important pre-conditions for cost control is that all the parties involved be 
aware of the significance of cost management to organizational strategic goals. External 
pressures, and internal structural rearrangement in response to these pressures, may create 
an environment in which cost accounting professionals can perform a systematic 
organizational intervention. This may help hospitals reduce intervention by outside interest 
groups. Unless such a structural rearrangement is made, any cost control attempt will be 
little more than an empty slogan, seen as a vehicle to justifying the costs already being 
incurred. When attempts to justifY existing costs are strong, it will be more difficult for cost 
accountants to obtain meaningful cost information in any type of a zero-based sense. 
When conditions are appropriate and all constituents agree with the need for 
controlling and managing costs, an ABC system will provide an effective cost control and 
management tool. An ABC system will require attempts to classifY maj or activities in the 
healthcare delivery process into (more or less) value added activities. An activity based 
management system suggests to the organization to prioritize activities (e.g., lab tests) based 
on their contribution to adding value in providing healthcare. Thereby, it is expected that 
costs can be reduced without lowering the quality of services provided. However, 
establishing such a system for a service industry like healthcare will not be easy. In the 
following section, we discuss the potential use of such a system for hospitals, and make 
suggestions for a conceptual framework of value analyses of activities in healthcare delivery 
processes. 
Unit of Analysis 
For cost control, it is important to identifY a unit-cost center-and the person primarily 
responsible for the unit. At the macro-level, an organization as a whole can be a unit for 
which the CEO is responsible. Cost information of an organization can be examined and 
compared to observe overall value-added from year to year. Value added of a hospital can 
also be compared to the value added of similar hospitals to observe the hospital's relative 
standing in cost management when providing comparable care. 
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At the unit level, each relatively independent department can be a unit of analysis. The 
department heads will ultimately be responsible for the cost effectiveness of their units, 
given the allocated cost of the support units. Once a cost center is established, we can focus 
attention at a micro-level to measure the specific cost saving opportunities. The individual 
service-related activities of healthcare providers can be broken down on a cost/benefit basis 
to allow such a micro-level unit for cost analysis. Thus, an ABC accounting system 
attempts to come up with a list of m~or activities providers conduct in producing services 
so that the costs of these activities can be calculated accurately and more meaningfully. 
Value Analysis of Activities 
The most important task, once such cost related information has been gathered for all 
activities, is setting priorities: i.e., what activities are more critical or value-added? In 
manufacturing organizations, ABC accountants trace the work flow and locate the value 
chain based on the strategic goals of the firm. They attempt to minimize the cost of internal 
processes that do not directly affect customer satisfaction. However, in hospitals, patients 
are an integral part of the service delivery process, and it is difficult to separate the input 
and through-put from the output. Therefore, there is a need for value judgments for each 
activity in relation to its potential benefits for diagnosing symptoms. These activities should 
be arranged in such a way that the more beneficial activities receive more support than the 
less beneficial activities. 
In order to determine the degree of value added of each activity, the clinical and 
financial responsibilities of physicians and the hospital must be fused. As discussed, this 
fusion can be attained by a traditional product design structure. Technology can also playa 
role in saving cost by taking over routine, marginally beneficial activities that can be done 
in a less costly manner. For instance, in many hospitals, storing and retrieving patients' 
information have been replaced by an automated computer system, saving a tremendous 
amount on staff-related costs. 
Gnidelines for Value-Added Judgment 
Value judgment of each and every activity is an important task for improving the cost 
effectiveness of an organization, and it is a crucial part of an ABC system. The following 
can serve as a guide for the value-added judgment of activities carried out in hospitals. 
(1) Operational and Environmental Uncertainty 
Activities that cope with higher uncertainty in a hospital should be considered to be 
more value-adding activities. Uncertainty can result from internal operation as well as from 
the external environment. If uncertainty is defined as not knowing of probable events and 
their causes, then not knowing what is going to happen in the market (i.e., environmental 
uncertainty) is as much a problem as not knowing how to conduct activities internally (i.e., 
operational uncertainty). 
Operational uncertainty partiCUlarly comes from not knowing cause-and-effect 
relationships, and an ABC system can provide a means of modeling such relationships. 
Anyone who can effectively cope with uncertainties in an organization should be perceived 
to be more influential (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings and Schneck, 1974). Therefore, any 
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activity that is geared toward coping with the critical uncertainties of healthcare delivery 
processes should be considered to be more important, and hence, more value-added. 
(2) Strategic Focus 
A critical activity for achieving the strategic goal of a hospital should be considered to 
be a more value-added activity. Not all activities contribute equally to accomplishing the 
strategic objective of an organization. Some activities are more critically related to the 
strategic focus of an organization than others. It can be the case that different activities 
suddenly become more critical than previously due to a change in strategic focus. Teams 
that are more closely tied to such a new focus should command more resources. Once there 
is a list of activities available, it is theoretically possible to rank order the criticality of each 
activity for achieving an intended strategic goal. Since a change in a goal brings about a 
change in the level of criticality of an activity, it is important to examine any changes taking 
place both within and outside of an organization. 
If a particular service is too expensive to obtain, even if it is critical for the strategic 
focus, the organization should seek an alternative source for that activity. If necessary, an 
organization should contract-out the services to a lower cost provider, rather than try to 
provide the services internally. Under the current arrangement, administrators may not 
make such decisions appropriately when they have reason to fear repercussions from losing 
patient volume to another agency or organization. 
(l) Non-routine and non-snbstitutability 
Non-routine and non-substitutable tasks should be considered to be more value-added 
than routine, substitutable tasks. Unlike an ABC system in the manufacturing sector, one 
must consider the concept of value-added in the service sector as a continuum, rather than 
as a dichotomy. Values added vary in degree on a continuum from less to more. Personnel 
with less training should handle the less value-added tasks, or a cost-effective automated 
system should take over such tasks. Technological advancement offers tremendous 
opportunities for cost saving. Non-routine, non-programmable tasks require more cognitive 
human judgment, more current information, and more extensive professional training. 
Frequently, these non-routine tasks contribute extensively to solving or reducing 
organizational uncertainties. Therefore, they should be perceived to be more important, and 
thus, more value-added than routine tasks. 
These guidelines form the basis of our conceptual framework for value analysis in 
healthcare organizations. More detailed operational procedures for adoption of the system is 
needed and will be addressed in our future research. For discussion of the current structural 
arrangement for hospitals, we largely identify how difficult it is to design a meaningful cost 
control mechanism for cost management in hospitals. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the current structural arrangement of both for-profit and 
not-for-profit hospitals. For the most part, cost management is not currently a meaningful 
strategic goal in either type of hospital. Particularly, in for-profit hospitals, administrators 
and physicians have a symbiotic relationship: administrators provide the maximum 
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professional autonomy to physicians and physicians bring in patients. Strategic goals of the 
two parties have little to do with substantive cost control efforts. In state-run and university-
related not-for-profit hospitals, the funding process does not appear to reinforce a policy of 
cost effective treatment of diseases. We contend that the current structural arrangement in 
the healthcare industry is not appropriate for reducing the costs of healthcare delivery 
processes. Instead, we suggested a stronger organizational tie between administrators and 
physicians in the hospital, such as an employer-employee type relationship found in HMOs 
that will align the financial and clinical stakes of both parties. Such an arrangement should 
better serve the needs of controlling costs and effective delivery of quality healthcare. We 
believe that the mounting reform pressures for optimizing cost and quality of healthcare can 
be met by an internal arrangement analogous to an integrated product line design. This 
would place all medical professionals, their support personnel, and administration personnel 
in a unified team. The team will be collectively responsible for managing the healthcare 
services and their costs, quality and profitability. 
We also suggested a framework for value analysis. This framework offers a theoretical 
foundation that can be used to help hospitals develop an Activity Based Management 
system. The success of this system requires a pre-condition: the need for a meaningful 
structural rearrangement. Both external and internal pressures towards this structural 
rearrangement are necessary for this endeavor, so that all the constituents of a hospital will 
have the incentive to accept introduction of a substantive cost management system. In our 
perspective, current National healthcare reform advocates who recommend imposing more 
external pressures upon providers, not just regulatory pressures but more importantly, 
market and informational measurement and disclosure pressures, are addressing salient 
issues. Whether the legislative outcome of the reform process will be an improvement, or a 
setback, will be partly contingent upon the successful implementation of such control 
mechanisms. 
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